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1. Introduction1 
Constructions referring to part-whole relations are quite usual in language: 
(1)  Ma main fait partie de mon corps.  
(‘My hand is part of my body.’) 
(2)  la poignée de la porte (‘the handle of the door’) 
(3)  le haut de l’armoire (‘the top of the cupboard’) 
(4)  Ce plat est constitué de poivrons et de morue.  
(‘This dish is made up of pepper and cod.’)  
(5) Cet atome a un électron. (‘This atom has an/one electron.’) 
Genitive constructions with (3) or without (2) “relational nouns” play an 
important role in the expression of part-whole relations (Barker, 1995; 
Partee & Borschev, 2003). This paper mainly focuses on such constructions 
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as well as on several well-known structures like Det Npart est une/fait 
partie de Det Nwhole (‘Det NPpart is (a) part of Det Nwhole’) (1) or Det 
Nwhole a un Det Npart (‘Det Nwhole has a Det Npart’) (5) which have been 
already addressed in other works on part-whole relations (Cruse, 1986; 
Winston et al., 1987; Iris et al. 1988; Pribbenow, 1995; Tamba, 1994). 
However, the constructions calling, to some or other extent, to part-whole 
relations are much more numerous and varied (4).2 Such a large range of 
expressions illustrates the importance of part-whole relations in language. 
As we will see in next section, a semantic analysis of these kind of struc-
tures shows that language makes sharp distinctions among part-whole rela-
tions. This paper proposes a formal analysis of the semantics of the part-
whole relations distinguished by language and shows, at the same time, that 
these relational distinctions heavily rely on distinctions among entities, 
more precisely on ontological and linguistic categories of entities. 
Besides the restrictions on linguistic constructions addressed in this work, 
additional constraints apply to the entities and configurations considered. 
We will limit ourselves to the study of descriptions that involve “spatial 
entities”, i.e., spatially extended entities and especially, material objects. 
A particular attention will be paid to the inferential properties of our formal 
proposal which is supposed to account for the deductions linguistically ex-
pressed. More generally, we make the assumption that the part-whole rela-
tions distinguished by language and the theory built for representing their 
semantics have a wider cognitive grounding and validity. 
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Previous semantic analyses and formalizations already exist for some part-
whole relations in linguistics, cognitive psychology, and philosophy, but 
curiously, for the “main” part-whole relation —the one involved in (1), (2) 
and (5) above, the existing proposals are very sketchy at best and puzzles 
regarding its inferential behavior remain unsolved. As a result, this work is 
mainly dedicated to this relation and the underlying notion of “functional 
dependence”. 
2. The multiplicity of part-whole relations 
As the expression of part-whole relations in language appears quite diverse, 
it is legitimate to investigate whether different kinds of expressions refer to 
a single relation or to several ones. 
From a linguistic point of view, the selectional restrictions induced by “ge-
neric” part nouns (e.g., partie (‘part’), bout (‘piece’, ‘bit’), constituant 
(‘constituent’), composant (‘component’), élément (‘element’, ‘member’), 
fragment (‘fragment’), membre (‘member’), ingrédient (‘ingredient’)) are 
not homogeneous (Iris et al., 1988; Aurnague, 2004). This would indicate a 
variety of relations, to which also points the complex distribution of some 
genitive markers (e.g, possessive and locative genitives of Basque) 
(Aurnague, 2002). 
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On the other hand, logical accounts of part-of relation traditionally appear in 
formal ontology, where, as for any formal relation, it is taken to universally 
apply to all domains and therefore to be unique. Theories of this fundamen-
tal relation in this field are grouped under the term “mereology”, coined by 
Lesniewski’s seminal work. (Lesniewski, 1927-31; Simons, 1987; Casati 
and Varzi, 1999) 
2.1. Part-whole relations in language are not just mereology 
In the standard theory (Simons, 1987), also called “classical mereology”, the 
part-of relation, often noted P (or PP for the proper part-of relation) is a par-
tial order, equipped with a fusion (sum) operator, and assumed to be exten-
sional, i.e., no two different entities have the same proper parts. 
As they are partial orders, P and PP are transitive. However, it has been 
pointed out long ago (Lyons, 1977; Cruse, 1986) that there are frequent cas-
es of intransitivity of part-of relation as expressed in language. For instance,  
(6) Marguerite’s tail is part of Marguerite the cow, and Marguerite is 
part of the herd, but Marguerite’s tail is not part of the herd;  
similarly,  
(7) even if The house has a door and The door has a handle are true, 
The house has a handle cannot describe the same state of affairs 
(it evokes at best a toy house with a carrying handle on top). 
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Additional features make classical mereology inadequate. The fusion opera-
tor being general, fusioning whatever entities makes up a new entity, and in 
particular, the fusion of any parts is itself a part. As a result, my left little 
finger plus my nose is “a” part of me, although this construct has no linguis-
tic existence as a single entity, neither, arguably, conceptual existence. Ex-
tensionality too, is controversial. Starting with the same parts, one would 
like to distinguish several wholes, as it has been argued since Aristotle that 
Marguerite the cow is different from the mere collection of its organs. 
Motivated especially by the intransitivity issue, and following Lyons’s sug-
gestion, several authors have explored the hypothesis of a multiplicity of 
part-whole relations. 
2.2. The multiple relation hypothesis 
The much cited article (Winston et al., 1987) distinguishes six relations, 
namely “component-integral object” (e.g., handle-cup), “member-
collection” (e.g., tree-forest), “portion-mass” (e.g., slice-pie), “stuff-object” 
(e.g., steel-bike), “feature-activity” (e.g., paying-shopping), “place-area” 
(e.g., oasis-desert). This distinction is based on three binary parameters, 
described in terms of properties that are external to mereology: the “func-
tional” role of the part with respect to the whole being supported or not by 
the specific spatial/temporal position of the part within the whole; the part 
and the whole being or not “homeomerous”, that is, “similar” or “of the 
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same kind”; and the part being “separable” from the whole or not. Each re-
lation corresponds to a different combination of the three parameters. The 
paper argues that each of the six relations is transitive and that 
intransitivities occur when two different relations are mixed. For instance, 
the invalidity of argument in example (6) is due to the fact that it combines 
“component-integral object” and “member-collection”. Although attractive, 
this thesis is too simple, as several relations are not themselves transitive: 
“member-collection” is never transitive, and (7) is usually taken to be an 
example of intransitivity of “component-integral object”. 
(Iris et al., 1988) examine dictionary data in which the term part or some of 
its synonyms (portion, piece, member…) appears. The authors conclude that 
it is necessary to distinguish four “models” or “schemata” of the part-whole 
relation: “functional component” (e.g., organ-body, engine-car), “segment” 
(e.g., slice-bread), “membership” (e.g., sheep-flock), and “subset” (as the 
authors focus on lexical classes rather than collections, the examples given 
for this case, e.g., tulip-flower, actually illustrate a taxonomic relation rather 
than a part-whole one). As far as transitivity is concerned, Iris et al. claim 
that neither “functional component” nor “membership” are transitive, but 
that “segment” and “subset” are. 
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2.3. The role of ontological distinctions among entities 
In the work just reported, especially in (Winston et al., 1987), there appears 
to be a pervasive parameter on which the distinctions between part-whole 
relations rely: the nature of the relata. Indeed, the terms themselves used by 
Winston et al. to designate their six relations, “object”, “collection”, “mass”, 
“stuff”, “activity” or “area”, refer not so much to relations, but to kinds of 
entities. Exploiting the existing analyses of such kinds, studied both in for-
mal ontology and in formal semantics, we propose to examine what in the 
part-whole relation(s) is specific to the ontological nature of the entities re-
lated. This study should result in the identification of the part-whole rela-
tions that it is legitimate to distinguish from the ontological and linguistic 
points of view. 
There are two orthogonal dimensions of linguistically relevant ontological 
distinctions, one which we will call “number”, and one which we will call 
“category”. 
2.3.1. Number 
In French, English and many languages, number is marked in a regular way 
both by syntax (determiners, number proper) and in the lexicon (countable / 
uncountable terms, collective terms). Formal semantics, through the study 
of plural expressions has developed several theories of number. 
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Classical analyses of plurals and groups (Landman 1996; Link, 1997) dis-
tinguish between atomic entities (atoms), which can be singular or collec-
tive, and plural entities (see also Muller’s chapter in this volume). Any col-
lective atomic entity, e.g., un groupe de garçons (‘a group of boys’), un 
orchestre (‘an orchestra’) or un troupeau (‘a herd’), is obviously “constitut-
ed of” some plural entity, e.g., John, Paul et Roy (‘John, Paul and Roy’), les 
garçons (‘the boys’), les musiciens (‘the musicians’), or les vaches (‘the 
cows’), which are “sums” of boy-atoms, musician-atoms, or cow-atoms. 
These classical theories of plurality are based on Boolean algebras with the 
null element removed, in other words, classical mereology. We have shown 
in (Vieu, 1991; Aurnague & Vieu, 1993) that using a theory of plurality 
which builds on (Link, 1983) (see also Muller’s chapter, this volume), the 
characterization of the relations of “Member-collection” and 
“Subcollection-collection” is immediate. 
Member-collection is the relation that holds between a singular entity and 
either3 a plural entity or a collection. It appears already in both (Winston et 
al., 1987) and (Iris et al., 1988), and is illustrated by the relation that may 
hold between une vache (‘a cow’) or la vache Marguerite (‘Marguerite the 
cow’) and either les vaches (‘the cows’) or le troupeau de vaches (‘the herd 
of cows’), le Texas (‘Texas’) and les Etats-Unis (‘the USA’), etc., as ex-
pressed by une de ces vaches (‘a cow from these cows’), Marguerite fait 
partie de mon troupeau de vaches (‘Marguerite is part of my herd of cows’), 
or Le Texas fait partie des Etats-Unis (‘Texas is part of the USA’). It can be 
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proven that this relation is not transitive, as illustrated by the counterexam-
ple Le Texas fait partie des Etats-Unis (‘Texas is part of the USA’) and Les 
Etats-Unis font partie de l’ONU (‘USA is part of the UN’) but Le Texas ne 
fait pas partie de l’ONU (‘Texas is not part of the UN’). 
Subcollection-collection is the relation that holds between two plural entities 
—or collections constituted by such plural entities, all the atoms of the first 
being also atoms of the second. (Winston et al., 1987) doesn’t consider it, 
and (Iris et al., 1988) appears to confuse it with the taxonomic relation “is-
a”. Linguistic examples are not very numerous, but we can still hold that 
this relation is referred to by expressions such as: Le Benelux est dans 
l’Union Européenne (‘The Benelux is in the European Union’), Le couple 
Dupont fait partie des gagnants (‘The Dupont couple is part of the win-
ners’),4 les pins de cette forêt (‘the pines of this forest’). This relation is 
transitive, and we can also show that Member-collection and Subcollection-
collection give rise to a mixed transitivity, as illustrated by a case in which 
Marguerite fait partie de mon troupeau (‘Marguerite is part of my herd’), 
mon troupeau fait partie du troupeau de toutes les vaches de mon village 
(‘my herd is part of the herd of all cows in my village’), and thus Margue-
rite fait partie des vaches de mon village (‘Marguerite is part of the cows of 
my village’):  
(Mb-Coll(x,y,t) ∧ Subcoll-Coll(y,z,t)) → Mb-Coll(x,z,t) 
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2.3.2. Categories 
Categories are expressed linguistically in a variety of ways. In many lan-
guages, syntax already encodes certain important distinctions: temporal 
(tense and aspect), spatial (pre- or post-positions, cases) or material (mass 
terms). Such distinctions often correspond to the “top-level” or fundamental 
categories in a formal ontology (Guarino, 1998). In the present work, we are 
using a set of “ontological categories” forming a coherent top-level ontolo-
gy from a metaphysical and logical point of view and as faithful as possible 
to the semantic distinctions deeply encoded in languages. 
Obviously, the lexicon covers a much larger range of distinctions, not all of 
them being relevant from a philosophical point of view, i.e., not prominent 
in an ontological analysis. The lexicon is often modeled as a taxonomy of 
“lexical types”, for instance as in WordNet (Fellbaum, 1998). Such taxono-
mies can be improved from an ontological point of view using formal ontol-
ogy methods (Welty & Guarino, 2001) and in particular restructured accord-
ing to a top-level ontology (Oltramari et al, 2002). Actually, a taxonomy is 
only the backbone of the lexicon, which needs to be given some flesh 
through the use of a large number of axioms and definitions, connecting 
linguistic conventions to ontological and, more generally, world knowledge. 
We will see in Section 4 that such a lexicon wealth and depth, with its tax-
onomy of lexical types, is essential for the analysis of part-whole relations. 
The notion of matter belongs to the ontological distinctions that in French 
and English are marked in syntax. In fact, mass terms and substance expres-
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sions have been studied extensively in formal semantics (see, e.g., Parsons, 
1970, 1975; Pelletier & Schubert, 1989), as well as in analytic philosophy 
(Quine, 1960), often using mereology as a theoretical basis (see also Mul-
ler’s chapter, this volume). These studies have helped understand what is the 
relationship between an “amount of a substance” (de l’eau (‘some water’)) 
and the “substance” itself (l’eau (‘water’)), as well as the correspondences 
between substances and “material objects” denoted by count nouns as in, 
e.g., un gâteau (‘a cake’) / le gâteau5 (‘cake’). The properties of being 
dissective or homeomerous (any part of an amount of water is an amount of 
water) and being cumulative (the mereological sum of two amounts of water 
is an amount of water) have been largely discussed, some authors retaining 
that they always hold from a linguistic point of view, others noting that 
dissectivity poses granularity problems (more conspicuously for mobilier 
(‘furniture’) than for eau (‘water’)). Let’s note that the spatial property of 
connectedness also alters cumulativity, at least from a linguistic point of 
view: deux morceaux de bois (‘two pieces of wood’) usually don’t make up 
un morceau de bois (‘a piece of wood’) and deux verres d’eau (‘two glasses 
of water’) is ambiguous between a single amount and a plural whose atoms 
are amounts. 
As shown in (Vieu 1991; Aurnague & Vieu, 1993), the use of three catego-
ries, “substance”, “amount of a substance” and “material object”, and a the-
ory of amounts of substance based on Parson’s, makes the formalization of 
two part-of relations, “portion-whole” (“portion-mass” in (Winston et al., 
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1987), “segment” in (Iris et al., 1988)) and “substance-whole” (“stuff-
object” in (Winston et al., 1987)), quite straightforward (see also Muller’s 
chapter in this volume). 
Portion-whole may hold between two amounts of the same substance, as in 
de l’eau de ce verre d’eau (‘some water from this glass of water’), or be-
tween an amount of a substance and a singular entity which is constituted of 
an amount of the same substance, as in une tranche de ce gâteau (‘a slice of 
this cake’). Portion-whole is transitive. 
Substance-whole can link two amounts of different substances like in le 
sucre de ce verre de limonade (‘the sugar in this glass of soda’) or an 
amount of a substance and a singular entity which is constituted of an 
amount of different substance, as in la farine du gâteau (‘the flour in the 
cake’).6 Again, Substance-whole is transitive. 
Formal semantics, often coupled with ontological investigations, yields the 
identification of further categories. Time has been extensively studied in 
many languages as well as in formal ontology, and, as a result, several pro-
posals for the subdivision of the “eventuality” category exist. The study of 
the semantics of French spatial expressions, in particular spatial prepositions 
(Aurnague & Vieu, 1993) and “Internal Localization Nouns” (e.g., haut 
(‘top’), bord (‘edge’), coin (‘corner’), centre (‘center’)) (Aurnague, 1996, 
2004; Borillo, 1999), as well as the study of the Basque genitives 
(Aurnague, 2002), have shown the necessity to distinguish the categories of, 
again, “material object” (e.g., un gâteau (‘a cake’)), “geographical loca-
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tion”7 (un champ (‘a field’)) and “space portions” (l’espace sous la table 
(‘the space under the table’), l’intérieur du verre (‘the inside of the glass’), 
un trou (‘a hole’)). 
In the remainder, we will focus on the category of material objects only. In-
depth formal studies of the possibly specific8 part-whole relations between 
temporal entities (corresponding to “feature-activity” in (Winston et al., 
1987)), geographical locations (corresponding to “place-area” in (Winston 
et al., 1987)) or space portions are left aside in this work and, to the best of 
our knowledge, remain yet to be done. 
2.3.3. The missing relations 
Restricting our investigation to the categories of “amount”, “substance” and 
“material object” and taking into account the orthogonal numerical dimen-
sion, we have been able to define four relations: Member-collection, 
Subcollection-collection, Portion-whole and Substance-whole. However, 
even considering only material objects, the picture is not complete. The ar-
guably most typical part-whole relation, the one involved in (1), (2) and (5), 
named “component-integral object” in (Winston et al., 1987) or “functional 
component” in (Iris et al., 1988), is missing. Although all these examples 
bear on material objects, this relation is apparently not directly dependent on 
the nature of the relata, as it rather focuses on a “functional link” between 
the part and the whole. Most descriptions point out that the part “plays a 
role” in the whole, and that both are conceived as “integral objects”, i.e., as 
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presenting a clear unity due to some specific “function” and as having defi-
nite “boundaries”. However, existing analyses, including our own previous 
work, stop at this level of description without giving a deeper account of 
what exactly is the functional link between the part and the whole. With the 
objective to make a significant progress in the characterization of the se-
mantics of the part-whole relations, the remainder of this paper is devoted to 
this relation, which we will call “component-integral whole”9 or CIW for 
short. 
Before turning to the analysis of the functional aspects essentially involved 
in CIW, let’s point out that there is still another part-whole relation between 
material objects. The relation involved in example (3) as well as in un mor-
ceau de la tasse (‘a piece / shard of the cup’) and l'avant de la voiture (‘the 
front of the car’) is not captured by any of the five ones we have listed. This 
relation, that we call “piece-whole”, is linguistically expressed using rela-
tional nouns that mostly are Internal Localization Nouns. It is perhaps the 
relation that is the closest to the mere spatial inclusion, except that the part 
is spatially connected, and that part and whole are material objects. We have 
proposed in (Vieu, 1991; Aurnague & Vieu, 1993) to define it on the basis 
of these properties, with an additional feature stating that there is no func-
tional link, i.e., that “piece-whole” and CIW are disjoint relations, to ac-
count for the fact that components cannot be described by means of terms 
like morceau (‘piece’). 
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3. Analysis of functionality 
The notion of function has been addressed in philosophy mainly with the 
objective of conciliating neo-Darwinism and the functional, teleological, 
talk widely used in biology (Allen et al. 1998). Although some authors have 
tried to extend their analysis of function in biology to a broader notion of 
function which would apply to artifacts as well, it is only recently that phi-
losophers have dealt specifically with artifacts. In computer science, re-
searchers have focused on the analysis of function in engineering. We will 
now quickly go through this literature to extract the key ideas to reuse, 
keeping one observation in mind. Even though language arguably makes a 
distinction between the natural and artificial realms in some occasions,10 and 
leaving aside the special case of animate entities and some of their body 
parts,11 it can be claimed that most languages do not systematically distin-
guish CIW relations on organisms from those on artifacts and other inani-
mate entities. We will therefore look for a generic notion of functionality. 
This very remark allows us to immediately reject as dedicated exclusively to 
artifacts the definition of function proposed in (Dipert, 1993) for it is based 
on the intentions, deliberations and actions of the artifact’s creator, and can-
not therefore apply to organisms and their parts.12 It can be noted that, prob-
ably for this reason, other scholars consider that function and creator’s in-
tentionality are two separated notions, although they are both at play in the 
categorization of artifacts (Bloom, 1996). 
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In philosophy of biology, the major trend is constituted by etiological ap-
proaches to functionality (see, e.g., Wright, 1973; Millikan, 1989). Function 
is there understood as the reason, or “purpose”, why a given component is 
present in a given organism, and is analyzed in terms of a causal history of 
the ancestors of this organism. The “disposition” of the trait that contributed 
to the survival and reproduction of its ancestors explains the presence of the 
current trait in the organism. Extensions to function of artifacts have been 
suggested by their proponents themselves, but such approaches are dis-
cussed and shown to fail in (Vermaas & Houkes, 2003); they appear in any 
case extremely complex and hardly applicable. We strongly doubt that the 
notion of function needed to account for the CIW relation makes necessarily 
reference to the causal history of a chain of items connected by some repro-
duction mechanism. On top of organisms and artifacts, CIW clearly applies 
to example (5) and other pairs of natural inanimate entities like an oxygen 
atom and a molecule of water, a planet and a solar system, a plate and the 
earth’s crust, a pond and the hydrological system of some area, etc. for 
which no sort of etiological account makes any sense. 
The philosophy of biology offers other solutions though, some authors re-
jecting the “backward-looking” notion of function to adopt a behavioral 
approach. The perspective is to explain how a component performs a func-
tion rather than why it is there. One of the most developed and famous ac-
count in this trend is that of (Cummins, 1975). Cummins proposes the fol-
lowing definition: 
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“The function of x in the system s is to ϕ, relative to an analytical account a 
of s’s capacity to ψ if and only if x has the capacity to ϕ in s, and a accounts 
for s’s capacity to ψ by, in part, appealing to the capacity of x to ϕ in s.” For 
instance, the function of a pigeon’s wing with respect to some analytical 
account of the pigeon’s capacity to fly is to generate lift and propulsion. 
This approach appears to be much more suitable to our generic needs, as it 
can apply to organisms as well as all inanimate entities, including artifacts. 
Philosophy of biology meets clearly here engineering approaches to func-
tionality, such as (Chandrasekaran, 1994), in which function is also essen-
tially based on structural knowledge and on the behavior of components. In 
this work, behavior of components are taken to be “local”, while functions 
are relative to the whole system. This is very similar to Cummins’s distinc-
tion between function and capacity, the capacity of ϕ-ing being understood 
as a disposition, i.e., a regularity in behavior (when a certain type of event 
occurs, the entity which has the capacity of ϕ-ing systematically manifests 
its capacity, it is ϕ-ing), while a function is a capacity which contributes to 
the capacity of a more general system. The function of wholes makes refer-
ence to the “capacity” of some larger system comprising, for an artifact, the 
user or even some social system, and, for an organism, its community to-
gether with its ecological niche. 
Defenders of etiological approaches (e.g., Millikan, 1989) have criticized 
the behavioral ones in that they miss out the normative aspects of functions, 
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and are unable to attribute a function to a diseased organ or a broken com-
ponent of an artifact. This is due to the fact that capacities are defined on the 
basis of regularities in behavior under certain conditions, considering only 
the behavior of the item considered, and not that of some “family” of items. 
They also point out that it is not trivial to fully characterize the “normal 
conditions” under which the regularities of behavior are supposed to be ob-
served. In addition, we observe that Cummins’s (as well as 
Chandrasekaran’s) notion of function presupposes an analytical account of a 
system (or some structural knowledge of it). That is, it presupposes that the 
system is already decomposed into components and therefore assumes the 
very relation CIW that we would like to define on the basis of the notion of 
function. It seems then difficult to apply for our needs, as a definitional cir-
cularity would result. In fact, the same argument sheds some doubt on the 
behavioral analyses of function themselves, since their authors have appar-
ently not paid much attention to what exactly are the notions of component 
and analytical system they are assuming. However, we do not want to pro-
pose here a new account of functionality in general; we just aim at capturing 
the functionality aspects involved in the semantics of the linguistic expres-
sions of the CIW relation. 
Even though we will retain some of the basic concepts of the behavioral 
approaches, our proposal departs somewhat from them. It could be related to 
Searle’s, who considers that functions, be they of artifacts, of organisms and 
of inanimate natural entities, are not intrinsic as they are always “assigned” 
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by an “observer” (Searle, 1995). We do not subscribe though to the bottom 
line of Searle’s approach which is to assume teleology necessarily underlies 
function; we only consider that the normative aspects of function are at-
tached to socially relevant categories of entities, namely the lexical types 
used to describe them. We will therefore (i) focus on the notion of function 
that does not only concern the actual entities at hand, but that is convention-
ally associated with the “types” of the entities as expressed by the lexical 
items used to denote them.13 And instead of making explicit reference to 
mental attitudes of some agents, to some causal history of a family of enti-
ties within a type, or to a previous behavioral-analytical account of the 
whole-type, we will more simply (ii) rely on a primitive notion of “func-
tional dependence” between types to account for the normative links be-
tween the component and the whole. 
4. Function of entities “under a description” 
4.1. Lexical types 
Let’s first examine why the functions that we should take into account are 
not those of the entity considered with all its properties, but only those that 
are associated to the lexical type of the entity. We hold that the way the enti-
ty is described by a noun phrase filters out the properties, including the 
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functions, that are relevant for the interpretation of natural language expres-
sions, including those denoting the CIW relation. In other words, the func-
tion of the part and that of the whole, as well as the roles these functions 
play one with respect to the other, may be made apparent or not by the lexi-
cal items chosen, and the resulting expression may denote or not a CIW re-
lation. To see this, consider the differences between the following genitive 
phrases and sentences: 
(8)  la tête du lit / ?la tête du meuble / ??la tête de l’artefact / *la tête 
du (morceau de) bois (‘the bedhead / the head of the piece of fur-
niture / the head of the artifact / the head of the (piece of) wood’) 
(9) Le moteur fait partie de la voiture / Le moteur fait partie du 
véhicule / ??Le moteur fait partie de l’artefact   
(‘The engine is part of the car / The engine is part of the vehicle / 
The engine is part of the artifact’) 
(10) une plume du canari / une plume de l’oiseau / une plume de 
l’animal / ??une plume de l’organisme   
(‘a feather of the canary / a feather of the bird / a feather of the 
animal / a feather of the organism’) 
In some cases, the difference in acceptation can simply be explained by a 
difference in denotation. Le lit (‘the bed’) and le (morceau de) bois (‘the 
(piece of) wood’) can arguably be considered as denoting different entities. 
Even though the literature in formal ontology on this topic is very large, a 
respectable position holds that the (amount of) wood constitutes the bed, but 
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the wood is not a bed and the bed is not wood, as both have different identi-
ty criteria (Welty & Guarino, 2001). This is the position we have taken 
above in our account of mass terms and the part-whole relations “Portion-
whole” and “Substance-whole” (see also Muller’s chapter in this volume). 
Matters are very different for the objects le lit (‘the bed’) and le meuble 
(‘the piece of furniture’, a countable noun in French), la voiture (‘the car’) 
and le véhicule (‘the vehicle’). In those cases, we unquestionably have taxo-
nomic relations between the corresponding categories, i.e., the bed is a piece 
of furniture and the car is a vehicle. We have categories of varying degrees 
of generality, but in each case, certainly the same entity. 
So, if the denotations are exactly the same, why is it that la tête du lit (‘the 
bedhead’) is perfect while la tête du meuble (‘the head of the piece of furni-
ture’) is at best awkward? It has been argued that the interpretation of the 
genitive involves the recovering of some linking relation from the terms 
used (Barker, 1995; Partee & Borschev, 2003), and similarly, we hold that 
when an expression (not necessarily a genitive) may denote the relation 
CIW, this relation can be recovered only if its functional aspects can be in-
ferred from the terms used in the expression. And since it is not typical for a 
meuble to have a tête (unlike to have a pied (‘leg’)), nor for a tête to be a 
part of a meuble, the functional relationship is not available, and the inter-
pretation of the genitive phrase is difficult. Obviously, a discourse context in 
which the entity denoted by le meuble is known to be a lit makes the inter-
pretation available: 
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(11) Un très grand lit occupait toute la chambre. La tête du meuble, 
bizarrement ouvragée, attirait l’attention.   
(‘A very large bed filled the room. The head of the piece of furni-
ture, strangely carved, drew the attention.’) 
Another phenomenon is at work with the unacceptability of ??-rated expres-
sions in examples (9-10) which use very generic descriptions, as l’artefact 
(the artifact) or l’organisme (the organism). It is certainly “typical” for an 
engine to be part of an artifact, and for feathers to be part of an organism, 
although the opposite is not true. But those generic lexical types, which cor-
respond probably to ontological categories,14 do not belong to the basic lev-
el (Rosch, 1978). In a study confronting taxonomies and “partonomies”, 
(Tversky, 1990) shows that it is unusual to describe such abstract entities by 
referring to their parts, so that the functional link may be difficult to recover. 
This could explain the data, but our analysis will not go any further in this 
respect in this paper. 
We will therefore take into account in the semantics of CIW the “lexical 
types” of the entities. We achieve this in a manner similar to that of (Masolo 
et al., 2004) for dealing with roles and, more generally, concepts considered 
from a constructive perspective. In this way, CIW doesn’t relate entities, but 
entities-as-a-lexical-type, i.e., entities from a given descriptive point of 
view. So doing, we base our analysis on the normativity of linguistic types 
and allow for mal-functioning entities; functionality is not inferred from the 
actual current properties of the entities at hand, but from those properties 
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that they would have if the entities were fully “functioning-as-a-lexical-
type”. Lexical types are reified, and are thus distinguished from the funda-
mental (top-level) ontological categories which are treated as unary predi-
cates. Reifying lexical types enables us to predicate over them and establish 
dependency links between those types and their linguistic and socio-cultural 
context (Masolo et al., 2004). Obviously, our approach relies on a rich theo-
ry of lexical types. (Pustejovsky, 1995) and even more (Asher, this volume) 
show that a structured lexicon is possible, although our work here, as well as 
others (Hathout et al., 2003) tend to show that an even richer account, that 
integrates more distinctions between lexical types and larger amounts of 
world knowledge, is necessary (Thomason, 2003). 
4.2. Function 
Now, what is the notion of function associated to a lexical type X? Defining 
capacities associated with a lexical type requires characterizing what are the 
“normal conditions” under which a certain behavior is observed. To avoid 
this, we do not simply adapt the behavioral approach to lexical types. In-
stead of considering capacities, i.e., potential behavior, we concentrate on 
the actual performance of the function at a given time. In other words, we 
do not focus on “being functional” but on “being functioning”. In addition, 
we want to characterize the full function, and not the local behavior. For 
instance, we do not consider as being functioning an engine switched on and 
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“working” flawlessly, i.e., producing motion power, while detached from 
any machine; we want to describe as “being functioning as an engine”, an 
engine working flawlessly within the larger system of some machine using 
its motion power. 
We will therefore use the property of “x being functioning as a X at time t”, 
considering the functional behavior that entities are typically supposed to be 
able to show to be described as a X.15 Of course, something can be de-
scribed as a type at a given time (e.g., this entity is described or classified as 
an engine), and not being at that time actually behaving as entities of that 
type typically do (as if the engine is currently switched off), and even not 
being capable of behaving as that type (as if the engine is flawed or broken). 
Conversley, something can be functioning as a type, while not being actual-
ly described as that type: many large enough and strong enough boxes could 
be used as stools, tables, etc., without being classified as such; so, in focus-
ing on “functioning as” rather than on “having the function of”, we clearly 
depart from the classical approaches to function.  
Two different predicates, CF(x,X,t) for “the entity x is classified as a X at 
time t” (Masolo et al., 2004) and Functioning(x,X,t) for “the entity x is func-
tioning as a X at time t”, are then needed. CF covers a wider range of prop-
erties than Functioning does, as a lexical type X is not only characterized by 
function, but also by shape, size or matter etc. (see, e.g., Bloom, 1996). On 
the other hand, Functioning is not just a restriction of CF with respect to 
functional aspects, because it stresses the actuality of the manifestation of 
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such functional aspects, while for CF their typicality and potentiality is 
enough. Aristotle referred to the fact that “a hand without the body is not a 
hand, except in an equivocal sense”, adding that “all things are defined by 
their function and capacity, so that when they are no longer such as to per-
form their function they must not be said to be the same things, but to bear 
their names in an equivocal sense”. Our approach is less demanding than 
Aristotle’s: it allows for detached or malfunctioning hands to be “classified 
as a hand”, while not “functioning as a hand”. 
We assume that “functioning as a X” could be defined for each lexical type 
X, perhaps relying on different approaches for artifacts or biological enti-
ties, even though we do not attempt this here. In the remainder, we will con-
sider only the inferential properties common to all instances of Functioning, 
that is, we will take Functioning as a primitive predicate. 
5. Functional dependence 
The predicate Functioning accounts for the expressed function of entities-as-
a-X, for which the literature shows the need to refer to some larger system. 
We have seen though that to avoid the circular reference to the CIW relation 
we need to abandon the original idea of the behavioral approach of a system 
with its analytical account. So, how to account for the functional links be-
tween parts and wholes involved in CIW? We will use what we will call 
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“functional dependence”, a special kind of generic dependence between the 
types X and Y. Functional dependence between a part and a whole states 
that the part plays a role within the whole, but doesn’t explain what exactly 
is this role. This yields a weaker notion of function than Cummins’s, but we 
will see in the next section that it is already quite powerful. 
Studying dependence between parts and wholes is certainly not a new idea, 
as it dates back at least to (Husserl, 1970). In formal ontology, mereological 
essentialism holds that parts are essential to their wholes (Chisholm, 1976), 
and many authors use the distinction between essential and non-essential 
parts (Simon, 1997; ch.7), as e.g., for a human, between its brain or its heart 
and one hair; the notion of “being essential” is based on that of existential 
dependence, either in its specific (brain) or generic (heart) form. In addition, 
the classical approach to the notion of unity of a whole is based on depend-
ence relations between the parts (Simon, 1997; ch.9). In linguistics, the fo-
cus is rather on the dependence of the part with respect to the whole, since 
many lexical types describing components are relational nouns or more gen-
erally, syncategorematic nouns.16 For instance, tête (‘head’), tige (‘stem’), 
poignée (‘handle’), all make an implicit reference to an including entity of 
some kind, and genitive constructions in which such nouns are the head 
usually refer to the CIW relation. 
The functional link we are looking for, though, is not that of essential part or 
whole, for we want to account for the CIW between a hair and a human or 
between a handle and a door: humans and hairs can exist separately,17 just 
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as handles can exist without doors and doors can exist without handles. 
What we need to consider is whether the entity-as-a-X which is the part (or 
the entity-as-a-Y which is the whole), to be functioning as a X (Y), requires 
the existence of some entity which is both classified as a Y (X) and func-
tioning as a Y (X). For instance, the functional relationship in the CIW be-
tween a handle and a door refers to the generic dependence between handles 
and, not doors, but more generically, “objects that can be moved or used by 
hand”, such that for an handle to be “functioning as a handle” there exists 
some object “functioning as an object that can be moved or used by hand”, 
i.e., being moved or used by some hand at the time considered. Similarly, in 
the opposite direction, a car (in the sense of automobile), to be functioning 
as a car, requires the existence of a functioning engine. And it can be argued 
together with Aristotle that a hand (or a human hair) to be “functioning as a 
hand” requires that some human exists which is “functioning as a human”. 
Let’s now see how such a functional dependence can be formally character-
ized. 
5.1. Generic functional dependence 
The most basic dependence relation is the one that holds between two indi-
viduals, namely specific existential dependence (Husserl, 1970; Simons, 
1987, ch. 8; Fine, 1995). x is dependent on y if and only if necessarily the 
existence of x implies that of y. The precise nature of the alethic modality 
 - 28 -
and that of the existence predicate (the existential quantifier will obviously 
not do here) is certainly debatable, but here, modifying slightly the pro-
posals of (Simons, 1987, ch.8), (Fine, 1995) and (Masolo et al. 2003), we 
will choose a S5 modality18 and a temporalized existence primitive: 
D(x,y) ≡ ∀t(E(x,t) → E(y,t)) ∧ ¬x=y ∧ ∃t E(x,t) ∧¬∀t E(y,t)19 
The second, third and fourth atoms in this definition avoid trivial cases that 
make the first atom true, when x and y are equal, when necessarily x doesn’t 
exist or when necessarily y always exists. 
Using the “classified as” predicate CF as axiomatized in (Masolo et al. 
2004), we further define generic existential dependence between types. It is 
important to note that in the axiomatization of CF, classification implies 
existence, i.e., CF(x,X,t) → E(x,t). 
GD(X,Y) ≡ ∀x,t (CF(x,X,t) → ∃y (¬y=x ∧ CF(y,Y,t))) ∧ ∃x,t 
CF(x,X,t) ∧ ¬∀t∃y CF(y,Y,t) 
It only remains to introduce the Functioning predicate in this formula to 
obtain generic functional dependence: 
GFD(X,Y) ≡ ∀x,t ((CF(x,X,t) ∧ Functioning(x,X,t)) → ∃y (¬y=x ∧ 
CF(y,Y,t) ∧ Functioning(y,Y,t))) ∧ ∃x,t (CF(x,X,t) ∧ Functio-
ning(x,X,t)) ∧ ¬∀t∃y (CF(y,Y,t)) 
We assume the following simple axioms on the primitive Functioning, 
where ⊆ is the mereological part-of relation between times20 and Subtype is 
defined on CF: Subtype(X,Y) ≡ ∀x,t (CF(x,X,t) → CF(x,Y,t)). 
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(Functioning(x,X,t) ∧ t’⊆t) → Functioning(x,X,t’) 
(Functioning(x,X,t) ∧ Subtype(X,Y)) → Functioning(x,Y,t)21  
On the basis of the properties of the modal operator  and these axioms, it 
can be proved that GFD is transitive, provided that X and Z are disjoint 
types (in terms of CF, i.e., Disjoint(X,Y) ≡ ¬∃x,t (CF(x,X,t) ∧ CF(x,Y,t))), 
and that GFD propagates from types to supertypes, provided the supertype 
is not necessarily always instantiated.  
(T1) (GFD(X,Y) ∧ GFD(Y,Z) ∧ Disjoint(X,Z)) → GFD(X,Z) 
(T2) GFD(X,Y) ∧ Subtype(Y,Z) ∧ ¬∀t∃x (CF(x,Z,t)) → GFD(X,Z) 
5.2. Individual functional dependence 
The functional link involved in a CIW relation between an entity x-as-a-X 
and an entity y-as-a-Y refers to the generic functional dependence between 
their lexical types X and Y, but we need in addition to establish that the link 
holds precisely between x and y. We thus now define “individual functional 
dependence”, between a x-as-a-X and a y-as-a-Y at some time t: 
IFD(x,X,y,Y,t) ≡ GFD(X,Y) ∧ CF(x,X,t) ∧ CF(y,Y,t) ∧ ∀t’ ((t’⊆t ∧ 
Functioning(x,X,t’)) → Functioning(y,Y,t’)) 
IFD requires that x and y are respectively classified as a X and a Y at time t, 
but it does not imply that x and y must be functioning (as a X and as a Y 
respectively) during all of time t; the conditional only states that when x is 
functioning, y must be functioning as well. So a car can be individually 
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functionally dependent on an engine even though it is at times parked with 
its engine off, or even if the engine is broken and the car cannot run.22 
We have already noticed that a door could have or not a handle, and that a 
handle, to be functioning, requires not necessarily a door (there are handles 
for knifes, bags, etc.) but more generally, some “object that can be moved or 
used by hand”,23 like, e.g., a door. Between a x-as-a-handle and a y-as-a-
door there therefore is what we will call “indirect individual functional de-
pendence”, based on the generic functional dependence between “handle” 
and some other lexical type subsuming “door”. “Indirect individual functio-
nal dependence” is thus defined: 
IIFD(x,X,y,Y,t) ≡ CF(y,Y,t) ∧ ∃Z (Subtype(Y,Z) ∧ IFD(x,X,y,Z,t))  
Of course, we have as a theorem: 
(T3) IFD(x,X,y,Y,t) → IIFD(x,X,y,Y,t). 
5.3. Formalizing Component-IntegralWhole 
We are now in position to define the CIW relation. There are four cases, 
according to the fact that the individual functional dependence is direct or 
not, and according to the sense of the generic functional dependence be-
tween the lexical types, i.e., either the part is dependent on the whole, or the 
whole is dependent on the part. In all cases, a CIW between x-as-a-X and y-
as-a-Y at time t requires that both x and y are material objects24 and that x is 
included in y during t.25 
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CIW-direct1(x,X,y,Y,t) ≡ Obj(x) ∧ Obj(y) ∧ PP(x,y,t) ∧ IFD(x,X,y,Y,t)  
CIW-direct2(x,X,y,Y,t) ≡ Obj(x) ∧ Obj(y) ∧ PP(x,y,t) ∧ IFD(y,Y,x,X,t) 
CIW-indirect1(x,X,y,Y,t) ≡ Obj(x) ∧ Obj(y) ∧ PP(x,y,t) ∧ IIFD(x,X,y,Y,t) 
CIW-indirect2(x,X,y,Y,t) ≡ Obj(x) ∧ Obj(y) ∧ PP(x,y,t) ∧ IIFD(y,Y,x,X,t) 
Let’s now see how several examples, already mentioned or not, distribute 
among the four cases:  
CIW-direct1: cuff-sleeve, stem-plant, carburetor-engine, finger-hand, hand-
arm, arm-body, hand-body, heart-circulatory system, nucleus-cell 
CIW-indirect1: handle-door (with “objects that can be moved or used by 
hand” for type subsuming “door”), door-house (with “wall, enclo-
sure, building, cupboard or vehicle” subsuming “house”), engine-car 
(with “machine” subsuming “car”), brick-wall (with “construction” 
subsuming “wall”), valve-carburetor (with “fluid-holding device” 
subsuming carburetor), feather-canary (with “bird” subsuming “ca-
nary”)  
CIW-direct2: wall-house, engine-car, electron-atom, atom-molecule, fin-
ger-hand, hand-arm, cell-heart, feather-canary 
CIW-indirect2: heart-circulatory system (with “pump” subsuming “heart”), 
brick-wall (with “construction material” subsuming “brick”)  
These examples show that in many cases (engine-car, finger-hand, hand-
arm, brick-wall, heart-circulatory system, feather-canary…) we have both a 
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CIW-1 and a CIW-2, that is, the part depends on the whole and the whole 
depends on the part. 
The existence of one CIW relation between two entities licenses the use of 
the corresponding genitive constructions (e.g., le carburateur du moteur 
(‘the carburetor of the engine’)) as well as of other part-whole descriptions 
(e.g., le carburateur fait partie du moteur (‘the carburetor is part of the en-
gine’)). In addition, distinguishing different CIW relations allows us to 
make predictions about determinative compound nouns of the form Npart 
de Nwhole (Nwhole Npart / NPpart of Nwhole; e.g., un moteur de voiture 
(‘a car engine’)) or Nwhole à/avec Npart (Npart Nwhole / Nwhole with 
Npart; e.g., un bateau à moteur (‘a motor boat’/‘a boat with engine)) 
(Borillo, 1996; Bosredon & Tamba, 1991). The predictions that can be made 
for each CIW relation can be stated as follows.26  
When there is a direct dependence of the type of the “head noun” on that of 
the “modifier”, the modifier adds no information with respect to the head 
noun, that is, the compound does not denote a proper subclass, and is thus 
ill-formed. So, if a CIW-direct1 relation holds between x-as-a-X and y-as-a-
Y then the construction NX de NY is ruled out: *un pétale de plante (‘a plant 
petal’), *un carburateur de moteur (‘an engine carburetor’), *un pouce de 
main (‘a thumb of hand’), *une main de bras (‘an arm hand’). Similarly, if a 
CIW-direct2 relation holds between x-as-a-X and y-as-a-Y then the con-
struction NY à/avec NX is ruled out:27 *une maison à/avec mur(s) (‘a wall 
house’/‘a house with wall(s)’), *une automobile à/avec moteur (‘a motor 
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automobile’/‘an automobile with engine), *un atome à/avec électrons (‘an 
electron atom’/‘an atom with electrons’), *une main à/avec doigts (‘a finger 
hand’/‘a hand with fingers’). 
On the other hand, when the dependence is indirect, the modifier may con-
tribute to specify a class of entities, provided that these entities are distinct 
enough from the rest of those denoted by the head noun, which is, indeed, 
often the case. So, if a CIW-indirect1 relation stands between x-as-a-X and 
y-as-a-Y, then the construction NX de NY is often acceptable: une poignée 
de porte (‘a door handle’), un moteur de voiture (‘a car engine’), une valve 
de carburateur (‘a carburetor valve’), une plume de canari (‘a canary feath-
er’). And if a CIW-indirect2 relation stands between x-as-a-X and y-as-a-Y, 
then the construction NY à/avec NX is often acceptable: un 
ordinateur ?à/avec touchpad (‘a touchpad computer’/‘a computer with a 
touchpad’), un bateau à voile/moteur (‘a sailing/motor boat’), un mur en/de 
brique(s)28 (‘a brick wall’). 
These different predictions on the (un)acceptability of determinative com-
pound nouns show that the four CIW relations distinguished above have a 
real linguistic —more precisely, semantic— ground. Further proof of their 
relevance is provided by the analysis of transitivity, a well-known elusive 
issue. 
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6. Transitivity 
6.1. Is Component-IntegralWhole transitive?  
We have seen in Section 2 that opinions on the transitivity of CIW are var-
ied. Example (7) has been given quite early in the literature as a counterex-
ample (Lyons, 1977; Cruse, 1986; Iris et al., 1988). Nevertheless, (Winston 
et al. 1987) hold that each kind of part-whole relation is transitive, and since 
they do not distinguish different cases of CIW, they assume it is transitive. 
(Simons, 1987) as well as (Casati & Varzi, 1999) suggest that according to 
the additional constraints that specific part-whole relations impose on top of 
the mere mereological relation, the relation may be transitive or not, but 
they do not analyze CIW any further. 
Some authors, though, have focused on the fact that CIW is at times transi-
tive and at times not. (Lyons, 1977) compares the two examples (7), refor-
mulated below, and (12): 
(7) The house has a door and the door has a handle but the house 
doesn’t have a handle. 
(12) The jacket has a sleeve, the sleeve has a cuff, and the jacket has a 
cuff. 
(Cruse, 1986) tries to explain this difference on the basis of the notion of 
“functional domain”: the functional domain of the handle is restricted to the 
door, while that of the cuff, by its embellishment role, encompasses the 
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whole jacket. To explain similar cases, (Moltmann, 1997) introduces the 
somewhat related idea of contextualizing the notion of “integral whole”. If, 
in a given “situation” s in which both x is part of y and y is part of z, y (e.g., 
in (12), the sleeve) is not considered as an integral whole, then the inference 
goes through and x is part of z in s. On the contrary, if y is considered as an 
integral whole in s (e.g., in (7), the door), the inference is blocked. 
Such explanations are not totally satisfactory because, apart from the fact 
that it is not trivial to formally characterize the notions of functional do-
main, integral whole29 or situation, they appear to fail to explain examples 
in which the transitivity goes through: 
(13) Le carburateur fait partie du moteur, le moteur fait partie de la 
voiture et le carburateur fait partie de la voiture. (‘The carburetor 
is part of the engine, the engine is part of the car and the carbure-
tor is part of the car.’) 
In (13), there is no obvious reason for a carburetor to have a functional do-
main including the car, nor for the engine to be a non-integral whole, or at 
least a “less” integral whole than a door in the situation in which the door is 
part of the house.  
We follow Cruse and Moltmann in trying to acknowledge the fact that there 
are both cases of transitivity and cases of non transitivity of CIW, but pro-
pose a new account. Before getting into the details, let’s observe that there is 
a simple way to turn example (7) into a case of transitivity: 
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(7’) The house has a door, the door has a handle, and the house has a 
door-handle (which is made of brass). 
This observation confirms what we claimed in Section 4, namely that CIW 
holds when it is possible to recover from the terms used what is the func-
tional link between the part and the whole. Here, changing “handle” in 
“door-handle” contributes to specifying what is the role of the handle with 
respect to the house, i.e., a component of a door, which is (assumed to be) a 
component of the house. 
6.2. (In)Transitivity of CIW revisited and other inferential properties 
On the basis of the transitivity of the mereological relation PP and the for-
mal properties of the relations of functional dependence  that we have intro-
duced, in particular (T1), the following theorems can be proved: 
(T4) (CIW-direct1(x,X,y,Y,t) ∧ CIW-direct1(y,Y,z,Z,t) ∧ Disjoint(X,Z)) 
→ CIW-direct1(x,X,z,Z,t) 
(T5) (CIW-direct2(x,X,y,Y,t) ∧ CIW-direct2(y,Y,z,Z,t) ∧ Disjoint(X,Z)) 
→ CIW-direct2(x,X,z,Z,t) 
(T6) (CIW-direct1(x,X,y,Y,t)∧ CIW-indirect1(y,Y,z,Z,t)∧ Disjoint(X,Z)) 
→ CIW-indirect1(x,X,z,Z,t) 
(T7) (CIW-indirect2(x,X,y,Y,t)∧ CIW-direct2(y,Y,z,Z,t)∧ Disjoint(X,Z)) 
→ CIW-indirect2(x,X,z,Z,t) 
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In contrast, the following formulas are not theorems: 
(i) (CIW-indirect1(x,X,y,Y,t)∧ CIW-direct1(y,Y,z,Z,t)∧ Disjoint(X,Z)) 
→ (CIW-indirect1(x,X,z,Z,t) ∨ CIW-indirect2(x,X,z,Z,t)) 
(ii) (CIW-direct2(x,X,y,Y,t)∧ CIW-indirect2(y,Y,z,Z,t)∧ Disjoint(X,Z)) 
→ (CIW-indirect1(x,X,z,Z,t) ∨ CIW-indirect2(x,X,z,Z,t)) 
(iii) (CIW-direct1(x,X,y,Y,t) ∧ CIW-direct2(y,Y,z,Z,t) ∧ Disjoint(X,Z)) 
→ (CIW-indirect1(x,X,z,Z,t) ∨ CIW-indirect2(x,X,z,Z,t)) 
(iv) (CIW-direct2(x,X,y,Y,t) ∧ CIW-direct1(y,Y,z,Z,t) ∧ Disjoint(X,Z)) 
→ (CIW-indirect1(x,X,z,Z,t) ∨ CIW-indirect2(x,X,z,Z,t)) 
We can note at this point that the assumption of (Winston et al., 1987) that 
all part-whole relations are transitive, and that intransitivities occur when 
mixing different relations is again not confirmed by our analysis, even 
though we have distinguished four relations. Indeed, (T4-5) tell us that 
CIW-direct1 and CIW-direct2 are transitive (provided the lexical types X 
and Z are disjoint), but CIW-indirect1 and CIW-indirect2 are not (because 
of ¬(i), ¬(ii) and (T3)). In addition, there are cases of “mixed” transitivities 
(T6-7). 
So, because of (T6) we can explain why (12) and (13) are examples of tran-
sitivity of CIW, seen as a global relation: any cuff functionally depends on a 
sleeve, any sleeve functionally depends on a garment, e.g., a jacket, there-
fore any cuff functionally depends on a garment, e.g., a jacket; any carbure-
tor functionally depends on an engine, any engine functionally depends on a 
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machine, e.g., a car, therefore any carburetor functionally depends on a ma-
chine, e.g., a car. Similarly, (14) is an example of transitivity because of 
(T4), (15) because of (T5), and (16) because of (T7).30 
(14) Ma main fait partie de mon bras, mon bras fait partie de mon 
corps, donc ma main fait partie de mon corps.   
(‘My hand is part of my arm, my arm is part of my body, there-
fore, my hand is part of my body.’) 
(15) Cet électron fait partie de cet atome, cet atome fait partie de cette 
molécule, donc cet électron fait partie de cette molécule.  
(‘This electron is part of this atom, this atom is part of this mole-
cule, therefore, this electron is part of this molecule.’) 
(16) Cette brique fait partie de ce mur, ce mur est une partie de la 
maison, donc cette brique fait partie de la maison.   
(‘This brick is part of this wall, this wall is part of the house, 
therefore, this brick is part of the house.’) 
On the other hand, because (i) is not a theorem (and because of (T3)), (7) 
and (17) are examples of non transitivity. As for (18), even though the de-
pendence goes both ways for the second premise, since (ii) and (iv) are not 
theorems, the inference doesn’t get through. 
(17) One says: la valve du carburateur (‘the carburetor valve’) and le 
carburateur de la voiture (‘the carburetor of the car’), but not 
??la valve de la voiture (‘the valve of the car’), nor ??La voiture 
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a une valve (‘The car has a valve’) and not even ??Cette valve fait 
partie de la voiture (‘This valve is part of the car’).  
(18) Cette cellule fait partie du coeur (‘This cell is part of the heart’), 
Le coeur fait partie du système circulatoire (‘The heart is part of 
the circulatory system’), but not ??Cette cellule fait partie du 
système circulatoire (‘This cell is part of the circulatory system’). 
Finally, let us note that our analysis can explain further inferential patterns, 
involved in the contrast between the first pairs of sentences of examples (8-
10) —leaving aside the problem of referring to ontological categories such 
as those of artifacts and organisms. Even if CF is transitive and Functioning 
and GFD propagate from subtypes to types, the following combinations 
only yield theorems on CIW:  
(T8) CIW-direct1(x,X,y,Y,t) ∧ Subtype(Y,Z) ∧ ¬∀t∃z (CF(z,Z,t)) → 
CIW-direct1(x,X,y,Z,t) 
(T9) CIW-direct2(x,X,y,Y,t) ∧ Subtype(X,Z) ∧ ¬∀t∃z (CF(z,Z,t)) → 
CIW-direct1(x,Z,y,Y,t) 
The other combinations, i.e., the following formulas, are not theorems: 
(v) CIW-direct1(x,X,y,Y,t) ∧ Subtype(X,Z) ∧ ¬∀t∃z (CF(z,Z,t)) → 
CIW-indirect1(x,Z,y,Y,t) 
(vi) CIW-indirect1(x,X,y,Y,t) ∧ Subtype(Y,Z) ∧ ¬∀t∃z (CF(z,Z,t)) → 
CIW-indirect1(x,X,y,Z,t) 
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(vii) CIW-direct2(x,X,y,Y,t) ∧ Subtype(Y,Z) ∧ ¬∀t∃z (CF(z,Z,t)) → 
CIW-indirect2(x,X,y,Z,t) 
(viii) CIW-indirect2(x,X,y,Y,t) ∧ Subtype(X,Z) ∧ ¬∀t∃z (CF(z,Z,t)) → 
CIW-indirect2(x,Z,y,Y,t) 
(T8) suffices to explain that la plume de l’oiseau (‘the bird’s feather’) in 
(10), which involves a CIW-direct1, can be described as la plume de 
l’animal (‘the animal’s feather’). On the other hand, since the relationships 
underlying the genitive expression la tête du lit (‘the bedhead’) in (8) are 
CIW-direct2 and CIW-indirect1 (with a very heterogeneous lexical type 
subsuming “lit” (‘bed’)), la tête du meuble (‘the head of the piece of furni-
ture’) is unacceptable in most contexts.31 In example (9), Le moteur fait 
partie de la voiture (‘The engine is part of the car’) is still a case of CIW-
indirect1 (with “machine” (‘machine’) subsuming “voiture” (‘car’)) and 
CIW-direct2. What makes Le moteur fait partie du véhicule (‘The engine is 
part of the vehicle’) acceptable is the additional knowledge that all vehicles 
are machines, or that a functioning vehicle requires a functioning engine. 
So, the notion of functional dependence goes a long way in explaining the 
behavior of CIW with respect to inferential patterns. Some puzzling cases 
remain, though. For instance, (19) should be an example of transitivity be-
cause it is an instance of both (T4) and (T5), but the consequent remains at 
best awkward. 
(19) Le doigt fait partie de la main / un doigt de la main (gauche) / La 
main a un doigt (‘The finger is part of the hand / a finger of the 
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(left) hand / The hand has a finger’), La main fait partie du bras / 
la main du bras (gauche) / Le bras a une main (‘The hand is part 
of the arm / the hand of the (left) arm / The arm has a hand’), 
??Le doigt fait partie du bras / ??un doigt du bras (gauche) / 
??Le bras a un doigt (‘The finger is part of the arm / a finger of 
the (left) arm / The arm has a finger’) 
To explain the intransitivity of (19) in its “has a” version, Cruse argues that 
the relationship between the hand and the arm is an attachment and not a 
part-whole. But if the first version of the second sentence of (19), la main 
fait partie du bras, is fine, this explanation is hard to accept. However, it is 
certainly true that “bras” (‘arm’) —just as “jambe” (‘leg’) with “pied” 
(‘foot’)— ambiguously denotes either the whole limb including the hand or 
only the part of the body between the shoulder and the wrist. This ambiguity 
may explain the unacceptability of the third sentence in (19).  
There are probably other problematic cases, and we cannot claim to have 
fully explored the meaning of CIW. The notion of function used here is per-
haps too general and arguably weak, simply relying on a “functioning as” 
primitive predicate, very lightly axiomatized. The real “functional role” of 
the part within the whole, surely coming in different flavors according to the 
corresponding pair of lexical categories, remains unanalyzed in this pro-
posal. On the other hand, what is proposed here can be useful to focus a 
future study of such functional role on relevant phenomena, eliminating the 
noise introduced by generic dependences in inferential patterns. 
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7. Conclusion 
We have shown in this paper that the analysis of part-whole expressions is 
largely dependent on both ontological categories and lexical types. 
Our proposal to account for the Component-Integral Whole relation on the 
basis of functional dependence between lexical types is capable of explain-
ing well-known puzzles regarding its inferential behavior, without the need 
to generically characterize function in a deep way.  
There are nevertheless several issues regarding to what does or doesn’t 
count as a CIW that are left open.  
Regarding organisms, there is perhaps the need to distinguish CIW from the 
relation of “being a product of”. For instance, bodily secretions (e.g., sweat), 
or even fruits on a tree are usually not considered as parts of the body or the 
tree, even though they arguably play a functional role in the organisms. It 
appears that the genesic (historic) dependence involved is more relevant in 
such cases than the functional dependence (Aurnague, 2004; Aurnague & 
Plénat, 1996).  
Regarding artifacts, similarly, the boundary between replaceable parts and 
consumables appears to be blurred: the role of the petrol in a car is concep-
tually distinguished from that of the brake fluid, for instance.  
Finally, the distinction between attachments and non-essential components 
is also often not clear, and may change along with the evolution of concepts 
associated to lexical types. For instance, since a radio doesn’t require to be 
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part of a larger artifact to be considered as functioning, while cars are not 
conceptualized as typically requiring radios to be functioning as a car, the 
relationship between a radio and a car is not one of CIW as we have ana-
lyzed it. Of course, if the lexical type used is that of auto-radio (‘car radio’), 
then, we have a functional dependence between the auto-radio and the car 
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 In the case of French, let us, for instance, evoke attributive constructions with generic part 
nouns (e.g., Ce pignon est un composant du mécanisme (‘This cogwheel is a component of 
the mechanism’)), descriptions integrating spatial prepositions (e.g., Le cerveau est dans la 
tête (‘The brain is in the head’), Le rétroviseur est à l’avant de la voiture (‘The driving 
mirror is at the front of the car’)) (Vieu, 1991; Vandeloise, 1986), Nwhole à Npart struc-
tures (e.g., un verre à pied (‘a stemmed glass’), un stylo à plume (‘a fountain pen’)) 
(Borillo, 1996; Bosredon & Tamba, 1991; see also below, Section 5.3), “composition” 
verbs (e.g., comporter/comprendre (‘to be made/composed of’, ‘to consist of’), contenir 
(‘to contain’), avoir/posséder (‘to have’/‘to own’)), “assembling/pulling away” verbs (e.g., 
assembler (‘to assemble’), réunir (‘to gather’), découper (‘to cut’), structurer (‘to struc-
ture’)) (Landelle, 1988) or “extraction/addition” verbs calling or not for particular deriva-
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tional processes (e.g., ôter/retirer (‘to take out’/‘to remove’), ébrancher (‘to prune’), 
décapiter (‘to behead’), plumer (‘to pluck’), ajouter (‘to add’), emperler (‘to put pearls’), 
plâtrer (‘to plaster’)) (Aurnague & Plénat, 1996; Gerhard, 1997). 
3
 Even though the examples here don’t seem to make much difference between a singular 
collection and a plural entity, the two have to be distinguished to account for surface syn-
tactic number as well as complex distributivity and cumulativity behaviors with respect to 
predication. Such linguistic grounds converge with the metaphysical argument that collec-
tions involve some kind of unity criteria that mere sums lack (see Moltmann, 1997). 
4
 This sentence is ambiguous between a reading in which the single winners are persons, in 
which case we do have a Subcollection-collection relation, and a reading in which the sin-
gle winners are couples (like in a dance competition), in which case we only have a Mem-
ber-collection relation. 
5
 Substance reading, as in Le gâteau fait grossir (‘Cake fattens’). 
6
 These definite descriptions make reference to the maximal amount of a certain substance 
in a whole. The relation Substance-whole actually applies to any amount of substance in-
cluded in the whole. 
7
 The object / location distinction is, from a most general point of view, contextual: any 
entity classified as a material object can (e.g., during a game) play the role of a “landmark” 
and temporarily be handled as a location, i.e., as spatially fixed in some frame of reference, 
in spite of its potential mobility in a larger environment. As a result, in formal ontology, 
“location” should be considered as a subcategory of “material object” or even not consid-
ered as a category at all because of this context sensitivity. But since the terrestrial frame of 
reference is permanently available for the description of most of our activities, the more 
specific “geographical location” can be considered as a separate category, and it is in fact 
encoded so in many languages. It is on this basis only that we can account for the French 
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preposition à (Vandeloise, 1988) and Basque genitives; the semantics of Basque genitives 
also requires “mixed entities” object•geographical location (Aurnague, 2002, 2004; see also 
Asher’s chapter in this volume). 
8
 One can notice here that we are assuming a “segregation principle” (Vieu, 1991) that is 
implicitly or explicitly widely accepted in linguistics (Kleiber, 1999): a part-whole relation 
cannot relate two entities of two disjoint fundamental ontological categories. For instance, 
neither the substances l’eau (water) and le bois (wood) nor the material objects la mer (the 
sea) and le bateau (the boat) can be part of the event la régate (the regatta); only events can 
be part of events. Note that some examples of portion-whole and substance-whole apparent-
ly relate an amount and an object, but the analysis shows that they always involve two 
amounts. 
9
 This relation was named “component-assembly” in our earlier work, but we felt that “as-
sembly” preferentially referred to the sub-category of artifacts. 
10
 This is the case of French derivative verbs calling for the prefix -é (e.g., ébrancher (‘to 
prune’), écosser (‘to shell’), égoutter (‘to wring out, to drain’)) which mainly apply to natu-
ral entities or “rough” artifacts (e.g., canvas) (Aurnague, 2004; Aurnague & Plénat, 1995). 
11
 Compare: ??Les poumons sont dans le (corps du) chat (‘The lungs are in the cat(’s 
body)’) and Les poumons sont dans le thorax du chat (‘The lungs are in the cat’s thorax). 
12
 Dipert actually suggests at some point that his approach could be adequate for organisms 
as well, based on an alleged necessity of our cognition to conceive function in terms of 
intentions, although no detailed proposal is actually made in this direction. 
13
 This move appears to fit with cognitive psychology studies that show that categorizing an 
artifact under type X relies on (the recognition of) the creator’s intention of making an 
entity of type X, rather than making an entity having a given “objective” function (Bloom, 
1996).  
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14
 We leave for a future paper the issue of whether and how language draws the line be-
tween fundamental ontological categories and lexical types, and in that case, how to deal 
with the lexical perspective given by terms arguably referring to such categories (e.g., enti-
ty, organism, or artifact). 
15
 We want to point at a weakness of this proposal that arises if one needs to take into ac-
count complex functions. It is very unlikely that a Swiss knife displays at a same time all 
dispositions that it has to possess for it to fall under the description “a Swiss knife”. Simi-
larly, birds don’t fly and lay eggs simultaneously. In addition, defining expected behavior 
may be difficult. I can consider that my car is properly working while its CD player is off 
or even broken; the issue is less clear when I’m driving with a flat tire, although I’m still 
being transported by the car. “Functioning as” surely requires further investigations, and the 
proposal further refinements. 
16
 Generic part names like partie (‘part’) or composant (‘component’) and Internal Locali-
zation Nouns are truly relational nouns, just as husband, sister or gift are: their denotation 
directly involves a (binary or ternary) relation and they are necessarily (perhaps elliptically) 
modified by a possessive or a genitive (de Bruin & Scha, 1988; Barker 1995; Partee & 
Borschev, 2003). No similar syntactic-semantic property exists for the dependence of the 
whole on the part, and the literature ignores “whole names”. Most part names (e.g., handle, 
feather) are not relational nouns, though; they nevertheless belong to the class of syncate-
gorematic nouns (Kleiber, 1999), which make reference to some dependence relation in 
their semantics.  
17
 A hair can exist even when no animal and no human exists any longer. There is no exis-
tential dependence, although there is a “genesic dependence”, a kind of “historic depend-
ence”. 
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18
 With or without the Barcan formula is not important, since what we need to prove our 
theorems is the Barcan converse, which we have anyway. 
19
 The language used is a sorted first-order logic with one modality. Uppercase letters are 
variables ranging over reified categories, and lowercase letters over standard individuals. ≡ 
is the syntactic relation of definition. 
20
 We assume extended times (intervals or sums of intervals). Any version of mereology is 
adequate for parthood on times. Only the concern of not making unnecessary assumptions 
justifies the use of  ⊆ instead of the general mereological relation  (see Note 25). 
21
 This axiom should be adapted to deal with typicality and non-monotonicity correctly. For 
instance to accommodate the existence of penguins, if functioning as a bird means flying. 
22
 This account of functional dependence is in principle not restrictive enough, since if x is 
flawed and never functions as a X during t, the conditional is true for any y. Some kind of 
causal connection between x and y is missing. However, for our purposes, the definition of 
CIW, a connection will be partially guaranteed by a mereological relation P between x and 
y. This is not a causal connection, but it excludes most irrelevant entities. 
23
 It appears here that, in a given language, the lexicon may require more lexical types to 
express its semantic interrelationships than are actually lexicalized. 
24
 We have focused here only on the case of CIW between objects. If, after further studies, 
it turns out that our analysis is also valid for “functional” part-of relations between geo-
graphical locations (an oasis and a desert), substances (water and milk), eventualities (a 
battle and a war), or even space portions (the inside of the drawer and the inside of the 
closet), then to account for the category segregation of part-whole relations, we could simp-
ly replace the first two atoms by Same-Category(x,y). 
25
 We use mereology for modeling spatial (or spatio-temporal) inclusion, without any addi-
tional “parthood” flavour. PP(x,y,t) means the extension of x is strictly included in that of y 
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during t. According to generic assumptions on the spatio-temporal of concrete individuals, 
a 3D or a 4D version of a (possibly non-extensional) mereology or mereotopology can be 
used. In our past work, we have been using a 4D version; see also Muller’s chapter in this 
volume. 
26
 It can be noted that these predictions heavily depend on the lexicon structure of each 
language and the approach adopted here consisting in formalizing functional dependences 
via lexical types seems to be well suited for grasping these differences. Among those pecu-
liarities, let us highlight that the French noun doigt (‘finger’, ‘toe’) can apply to both hands 
and feet whereas pouce (thumb) is exclusive for hands, and that the English handle can 
identify a larger variety of parts (of objects that can be moved or used by hand) than the 
French terms manche, poignée, anse or queue which are restricted to narrower categories. 
27
 Constructions calling for à are more grammaticalized than those calling for avec, giving 
rise to real compound nouns (Borillo, 1996; Bosredon & Tamba, 1991). This is probably 
the reason for which in these examples the constructions with à sound even less acceptable 
than the constructions with avec. 
28
 When the integrated whole is constituted by a collection of functional components of a 
same type, the prepositions en (‘in’) or de (‘of’) are used instead of à/avec: NY en/de NX. 
29
 (Simons, 1987) proposes for instance to rely on some dependence relation between the 
parts to define an integral whole as a maximum sum of interdependent entities. With such a 
definition, simply no integral whole can be part of another integral whole. 
30
 See the classification of examples in Section 5.3 for the clarification of the premises. 
31
 In a context in which the piece of furniture is known to be a bed, the anaphoric resolution 
procedure should be extended to cover the substitution of the lexical types within the CIW 
relation. 
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